

1 John P. Hooper (*pro hac vice*)
2 *jhooper@kslaw.com*
3 **KING & SPALDING LLP**
4 1185 Avenue of the Americas
5 New York, NY 10036
6 Tel: (212) 556-2100
7 Facsimile: (212) 556-2222

8 Alexander G. Calfo (SBN 152891)
9 *acalfo@kslaw.com*
10 Alexandra Kennedy-Breit (SBN 316590)
11 *akennedy-breit@kslaw.com*
12 **KING & SPALDING LLP**
13 633 West 5th Street, Suite 1600
14 Los Angeles, CA 90071
15 Tel: (213) 443-4355
16 Facsimile: (213) 443-4310

17 Attorneys for Defendant
18 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC.
19 *Additional attorneys on signature page*

20 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
21 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

22 ALFRED SALAS and GLORIA
23 ORTEGA, individually and on behalf of
24 a class of similarly situated individuals,

25 Plaintiffs,

26 vs.

27 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A.,
28 INC.

Defendant.

Case No: 2:15-cv-08629-HDV-E

**DEFENDANT’S SECOND
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENT**

Date: December 12, 2024
Time: 10:00 am
Judge: Judge Hernán D. Vera
Courtroom: 5B

[REDACTED VERSION OF DOCUMENT FILED UNDER SEAL]

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (“Toyota” and/or “Defendant”) files
3 this Second Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Final Approval
4 of Class Action Settlement. The Court’s Minute Order from the October 30, 2024
5 Fairness Hearing, ordered the parties to address (i) whether the expected claim rate in
6 this case is acceptable under Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 23(e); (ii) whether, and, if so, how the
7 proposed settlement is analogous to other class settlements that have been approved; and
8 (iii) how the balance between the economic benefit to the class members and attorneys’
9 fees is consistent with *Briseño v. Henderson*, 998 F. 3d 1014, 1026 (9th Cir. 2021). *See*
10 Dkt. No. 285.

11 While the Court raised issues regarding the percentage of Class Members that have
12 participated in the proposed Settlement thus far, the participation rate is in fact consistent
13 with the evidence Toyota previously provided to the Court during the litigation. As
14 presented in Toyota’s Opposition to the Motion for Class Certification and again in
15 Toyota’s decertification motion, 2012 to 2016 survey data estimated odor complaint rates
16 for the relevant Toyota Camry vehicles at between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. *See* Declaration of
17 Lisa R. Weddle in Support of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.’s Motion to Decertify
18 Class dated July 14, 2022 (Dkt. No. 149-2) (“Weddle Decl.”) at Ex. A, pp. 9-13. Using
19 the conservative (high) end of that range, only [REDACTED] of the 215,578 Subject Vehicles
20 purportedly may experience an odor issue. The 245 claims received as of October 16,
21 2024 – less than five months since the Initial Notice Date – already represents [REDACTED] (of
22 the survey data projection of [REDACTED] Subject Vehicles) that could potentially experience
23 odor and for which Class members would be eligible to seek relief.

24 Additionally, it is reasonable to expect the number of submitted claims to increase
25 with another six to eighteen months remaining in the Claims period depending on the
26 model year Subject Vehicle. For example, if 1,000 claims are submitted, as the Court
27
28

1 hypothesized at the Fairness Hearing, the claims rate would exceed [REDACTED] of the
2 potentially affected Subject Vehicles – a significant percentage.

3 Additionally, the proposed Settlement meets all of the *Staton* factors, does not
4 present the *Bluetooth* “red flags” and is therefore analogous to other class settlements
5 that have been approved. *See Staton v. Boeing Co.*, 327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003); *In re*
6 *Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bluetooth)*, 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011). Here,
7 two main factors demonstrate the reasonableness and value conveyed by this settlement:

8 First, there was an incredible risk to the class if the case proceeded to trial—a
9 similar Toyota Camry HVAC class action in the District Court for the Southern District
10 of Florida, *Cardenas v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., et al.*, received a defense verdict in
11 2023. However, the settlement relief addresses the alleged odor issue identified in the
12 operative Complaint. Rather than the uncertain outcome of a trial, the parties crafted a
13 significant settlement process that provides the relief sought for the class –
14 reimbursement of costs associated with mitigating alleged HVAC odor.

15 Second, the extraordinary notice meets, if not exceeds, any requirements necessary
16 to approve the Settlement. The Notice Administrator implemented an exceptional Notice
17 Plan, sending 645,000 Direct Mailed Notices to the 368,000 Class Members and reached
18 98% of the Class approximately 3 times. *See* Supplemental Declaration of Cameron R.
19 Azari, Esq. Regarding Implementation and Adequacy of Class Notice Plan, October 16,
20 2024 (Dkt. No. 279-1) (“Supp. Azari Decl.”) at ¶7. Class Members have proactively
21 sought additional information on the proposed Settlement as 19,933 unique users visited
22 the Settlement website and 1,151 calls were made to the IVR toll-free number. *Id.* ¶¶ 21,
23 22. Despite this overwhelming reach to the Class, not a single Class Member objected
24 to the Settlement and only two Class Members chose to opt-out.

25 The proposed Settlement is also nothing like that found in *Briseño*, where ***no direct***
26 ***notice*** was required and there was evidence of collusion. Here, 645,000 Direct Mailed
27 Notices were sent that informed individual Class Members of the components of the
28

1 proposed Settlement. Furthermore, applying the *Bluetooth* factors as required by
2 *Briseño*, there is no evidence of collusion, since the parties’ negotiations (including with
3 respect to Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees) actively involved Settlement Special Master
4 Patrick A. Juneau and took place on the heels of a hotly litigated period of trial
5 preparations and on the cusp of trial.

6 For the reasons set forth in more detail below and those contained in Toyota’s prior
7 memoranda of law in support of final approval, this Court should enter an order granting
8 final approval and issue a permanent injunction pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
9 § 1651(a) and the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

10 **II. THE CLAIM RATE IS ACCEPTABLE UNDER RULE 23(E) GIVEN THE**
11 **LOW ODOR COMPLAINT RATES**

12 **A. A Low Percentage of Subject Vehicles Were the Subject of Odor**
13 **Complaints.**

14 The claim rate is more than acceptable under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of
15 Civil Procedure because the claim rate should be calculated not based on the total number
16 of Subject Vehicles, but rather the number of Subject Vehicles that would have the
17 potential for an odor issue. As Toyota presented previously to the Court, survey data
18 indicated complaint rates between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] for relevant Toyota Camry vehicles.
19 *See* Weddle Decl. at Ex. A, pp. 9-13.

20 Here, there are 215,578 unique Subject Vehicles as defined in the Class. *See*
21 Declaration of Cameron R. Azari, Esq. Regarding Implementation and Adequacy of
22 Class Notice Plan, August 28, 2024 (Dkt. No. 274-7) (“Azari Decl.”) at ¶11. Therefore,
23 even assuming the highest odor complaint rate of [REDACTED], fewer than [REDACTED] Subject
24 Vehicles would potentially have been impacted by an odor issue and would have sought
25 to resolve the issue (by installing a charcoal filter or flushing the vehicle’s evaporator)
26 and seek reimbursement through the proposed Settlement.

1 Based on the low number of Subject Vehicles that could have experienced an odor
2 issue, it is consistent that a smaller number of claims would be submitted.

3 **B. The Number of Claims Received Thus Far Is Reasonable**

4 At the time of the Final Approval Hearing, settlement Class Members had filed
5 245 claims with the Notice Administrator. *See* Supp. Azari Decl. at ¶24. While the
6 Court’s comment that the 245 claims amounted to a claim rate of 0.1%, that calculation
7 was based on the assumption that all 215,578 Subject Vehicles would have required a
8 charcoal filter or an evaporator flushing. But this is not the case. As noted above, the
9 Subject Vehicles that could potentially have experienced an odor issue represents a very
10 small percentage of the total number of Subject Vehicles—only [REDACTED] vehicles assuming
11 the highest survey data complaint rate in evidence (*i.e.*, [REDACTED]). That is the subset of
12 Subject Vehicles that is appropriate to use as the denominator in determining the relevant
13 claim rate, rather than all Subject Vehicles. Adjusting the calculation accordingly, the
14 current claim rate is approximately [REDACTED] and should increase from there.

15 Further, the claims period has not yet closed and remains open for another six or
16 18 months, depending on the model year of the Subject Vehicle. Class Members with
17 model year 2014-2015 Subject Vehicles may file a claim for relevant out-of-pocket
18 expenses occurred after the Initial Notice Date until May 31, 2026, and Class Members
19 with model year 2012-2013 Subject Vehicles have until May 31, 2025. *See* Settlement
20 Agreement at III.A.3.(c) and (d) (Dkt. No. 274-3) (“Settlement Agreement”). Class
21 Members may also file claims for reimbursement of relevant out-of-pocket expenses
22 incurred on or before the Initial Notice date until May 31, 2025. *Id.* at III.A.4.(c).

23 Additionally, claim rates also generally increase immediately prior to a claim
24 deadline. *See* Declaration of Patrick A. Juneau in Support of Final Settlement Approval
25 (Dkt. No. 293-1) (“Juneau Decl.”) at 12. *See also* Second Supplemental Declaration of
26 Cameron R. Azari, Esq. Regarding Implementation and Adequacy of Class Notice Plan
27 (Dkt. No. 293-2) at ¶8 (noting in his experience that receipt of claims tend to increase
28

1 towards the claims deadline.) As such, the claim rate likely will continue to increase.
2 Assuming 1,000 claims are submitted¹ – this would equal a [REDACTED] claims rate which
3 would exceed the claim rate of nine percent noted by the Court at the Fairness Hearing.
4 See Fairness Hearing Transcript at 7:18.

5 **III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT IS ANALOGOUS TO OTHER**
6 **APPROVED SETTLEMENTS**

7 **A. The Proposed Settlement Satisfies All of the *Staton* and *Bluetooth***
8 **Factors**

9 As is the case with all class action settlements approved in the Ninth Circuit, the
10 proposed Settlement meets all of the *Staton* factors and “is not the product of collusion
11 among the negotiating parties” as required by *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*,
12 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). A full discussion of the factors is included in Toyota’s
13 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
14 Settlement, Dkt. No. 275, and Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion
15 for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Dkt. No. 282. However, certain factors
16 are analyzed below to compare this proposed Settlement to other settlements that have
17 received final approval.

18 **B. The Notice Program Was Comprehensive with Unprecedented Reach**

19 The extraordinary Notice Program was fully and completely implemented,
20 consistent with the Preliminary Approval Order. It provided interlocking methods that
21 aimed to reach each Class Member individually and directly using reasonably available
22 address information, and it also provided multiple alternative forms of notice through
23 which Class Members may have learned of the settlement or obtained further information
24 about their rights. Thus, the procedure for providing notice and the content of the Notice
25 Program constituted the best practicable notice to Class Members. See *In re LinkedIn*
26 *Priv. Litig.*, 309 F.R.D. at 585–86.

27
28 ¹ See Fairness Hearing Transcript at 7:11-14.

1 As of October 16, 2024, the settlement website had 19,933 unique visitor sessions,
2 with 38,996 web pages presented. *See* Supp. Azari Decl. at ¶ 21. As of October 16,
3 2024, there have been 1,151 calls to the IVR toll-free number, and service agents have
4 handed 736 incoming calls and 38 outgoing calls. *Id.* ¶ 22. Further, the Notice Program
5 is estimated to have reached 98 percent of the Class approximately 3 times, readily
6 satisfying due process. *Id.* ¶ 7. This reach is well beyond the reach of other class action
7 settlements that have received final approval. *See Schneider v. Chipotle Mexican Grill,*
8 *Inc.*, 336 F.R.D. 588, 596–97 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (finding proper notice where the notice
9 “was likely viewed by approximately 72.64% of the Settlement Class” with “an average
10 estimated frequency of 3.0 per person”); *Corzine v. Whirlpool Corp.*, No. 15-cv-05764-
11 BLF, 2019 WL 7372275, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2019) (holding notice was adequate
12 where it had “an approximate reach of 71.99% and an approximate average frequency of
13 2.99 times each”).

14 **C. The Settlement Provides Relief for the Alleged Defect at Issue, and the**
15 **Class Overwhelming Supports It**

16 The Settlement Agreement is designed to directly address the specific concerns of
17 Class Members who may have been affected by an alleged odor issue that is the subject
18 of this Action. Class Members are entitled to be reimbursed for the entire cost of
19 replacing and installing a charcoal filter in a Subject Vehicle and/or having the evaporator
20 flushed on a Subject Vehicle if those costs were incurred prior to the Initial Notice Date.
21 Settlement Agreement at III.A.4. Class Members who choose to replace and install a
22 charcoal filter in a Subject Vehicle or have the evaporator flushed on a Subject Vehicle
23 after the Initial Notice Date can also seek reimbursement up to \$100. *Id.* at III.A.3.

24 It is clear that the Class overwhelmingly supports the relief provided in this
25 settlement. Ninety-eight percent of the Class was reached an average of three times, yet
26 not a single objection was filed. Supp. Azari Decl. at ¶24. Further, only two requests
27 for exclusion were received. *Id.* Out of approximately 368,000 Class Members, this
28

1 amounts to an exclusion rate of 0.005%.² See Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum
2 of Law in Further Support of Class Action Settlement a section II.A (Dkt. No. 282). This
3 overwhelmingly favorable response from the Class weighs heavily in favor of final
4 approval of the settlement. See *Kearney v. Hyundai Motor Am.*, No. SACV 09-1298-
5 JST (MLGx), 2013 WL 3287996, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2013) (finding 0.0025%
6 objections and 0.0277% opt outs “infinitesimal”); see also *Sebastian v. Sprint/United*
7 *Mgmt. Co.*, No. 8:18-cv-00757-JLS-KES, 2019 WL 13037010, at *4, *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec.
8 5, 2019) (granting final approval to a class in which 0.67% of the class had submitted
9 opt-out requests).

10 **D. Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate Given the Significant**
11 **Risks to the Class in Proceeding to Trial**

12 It is well accepted that the unpredictability of trials generally weighs in favor of
13 finding that a settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. See *Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g*
14 *Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 964 (9th Cir. 2009). The particular procedural history of this case
15 weighs in favor of approving settlement here. See Juneau Decl. at ¶7.

16 This case has been strongly litigated, with considerable success by Toyota. The
17 Court granted (in part) Toyota’s motion to dismiss on September 27, 2016. See Dkt. No.
18 38. While Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint, on September 29, 2017 the
19 Court granted part of Toyota’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing implied
20 warranty claims. See Dkt. No. 81. Following certification of a California-only class, on
21 March 31, 2023, the Court granted Toyota’s partial motion for summary judgment,
22 dismissing Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment and California Unfair Competition Law claims,
23 as well as dismissing Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief under California’s Consumer
24 Legal Remedies Act. See Dkt. No. 166. The Court also granted in part Toyota’s motion
25 to decertify, excluding any equitable claims from the Class. *Id.* On January 10, 2024, the
26

27 ² Through the data acquisition process, 215,578 unique VINs for 2012-2015 Model Year Toyota Camrys were identified.
28 After de-duplication, those VINs were associated with 368,356 current or former owners who were individuals and not
otherwise excluded from the Class definition. See Azari Decl., ¶11-12. As such, while there are approximately 215,000
Subject Vehicles, there are approximately 368,000 Class Members. See also Juneau Decl. at ¶11.

1 Court partially granted Toyota’s motion to narrow the class, excluding Class Members
2 who claims would require individual assessment to address Toyota’s defense that certain
3 claims were time-barred. *See* Dkt. No. 220.

4 Thus, there was a clear risk to the Class if the case proceeded to trial that they
5 would lose or be subject to unfavorable appellate rulings. *See* Juneau Decl. at ¶7. This
6 risk was underscored by Toyota’s success in similar proceedings outside the instant class
7 action—in Florida, the same claims at issue here were tried and resulted in a defense
8 verdict in March 2023, *Cardenas v. Toyota Motor Corp.*, Case No. 18-cv-22798 (S.D.
9 Fla.); and in another action in California, plaintiffs were denied certification in an action
10 making similar allegations of an alleged HVAC odor defect, *Stockinger v. Toyota Motor*
11 *Sales, U.S.A., Inc.*, 2:17-cv-00035-VAP-KS (C.D. Cal.). The proposed Settlement—
12 which guarantees Class Members relief—has significant benefits to “rolling the dice”
13 and proceeding to trial, with the very real possibility of recovering nothing. *See, e.g., In*
14 *re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prods. Liab.*
15 *Litig.*, No. 8:10ML 02151 JVS (FMOx), 2013 WL 12327929, at *14, *20 (C.D. Cal. July
16 24, 2013) (approving class settlement and noting, “[s]imply put, Plaintiffs might
17 eventually recover more with continued litigation, but they also might recover nothing”).

18 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S**
19 **DECISION IN *BRISEÑO***

20 In *Briseño v. Henderson*, 998 F. 3d 1014, 1026 (9th Cir. 2021), the Ninth Circuit
21 found that “the parties did more than just check every *Bluetooth* box; their settlement
22 presented a Murderers’ Row of provisions out of left field that seemingly favor class
23 counsel and the defendant at the expense of the class members.” *Id.* Specifically, the
24 Court cited to the *Bluetooth* factors and the three “red flags”—(1) whether plaintiffs’
25 counsel will receive a disproportionate distribution of the settlement; (2) the existence of
26 a “clear sailing agreement”, which would require additional scrutiny over the relationship
27 between attorney’s fees and benefit to the class; and (3) whether a reduction in the
28

1 amount of attorney’s fees would revert to the class or the defendant.³ *Id* at 1026-27. The
2 Court was deeply troubled by several aspects of the settlement (which did not require
3 direct notice to class members), including the parties’ assessment of settlement value and
4 the comparative value of the attorney’s fees being requested. Ultimately, in applying the
5 *Bluetooth* factors, the Court reversed the district court’s approval of the settlement and
6 remanded.

7 While the Court in *Briseño* expressed clear concerns about the settlement that had
8 been reached between the parties, it also stressed that nothing in its opinion “suggests
9 that courts should unnecessarily meddle in class settlements negotiated by the
10 parties...Far from it. Nor do we seek to make any of the identified signs of collusion an
11 independent basis for withholding settlement approval. Disproportionate fee awards,
12 clear sailing agreements, and kicker clauses all may be elements of a good deal.” *Id.* at
13 1027. Rather, the Court was emphasizing the duty of District Court’s to scrutinize the
14 factors as prescribed by *Bluetooth*. *Id.*

15 The proposed Settlement here is clearly distinguishable from the purported
16 settlement in *Briseño*. While direct notice was not even required in the *Briseño*
17 settlement, the Notice Program here had extraordinary reach directly to settlement Class
18 Members, and resulted in no appealable objections. *See* section III.B. and C. *supra*.
19 Further, the proposed Settlement provides impacted Class Members with the relief that
20 directly addresses their concern (reimbursement of expenses to address the odor issues
21 alleged in the operative Complaint) and is why the Class have overwhelmingly approved
22 the proposed Settlement. *See* section III.C. *supra*.

23 Finally, as previously addressed, there is no evidence of the type of collusion that
24 was considered by *Bluetooth*. *See* Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of
25 Motion for Final Approval at Section V (Dkt. No. 275); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of
26 Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
27

28 ³ Toyota is not addressing factors (1) and (3) as they deal with Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees request.

1 Settlement at Section IV.B.7 (Dkt. No. 274-1); *see also* Juneau Decl. at ¶¶7-10. While
2 there is a clear-sailing provision in this case, this factor simply requires a higher level of
3 scrutiny by the Court. *Briseño* at 1026-27. Even under close scrutiny, as the Court noted
4 in its Order (1) Granting Motion For Preliminary Approval Of Class Settlement,
5 Certifying Settlement Class, And Directing Notice To The Class; And (2) Scheduling A
6 Fairness Hearing, there is no indication of collusion between the parties. *See* Dkt. No.
7 273 at 6. Quite the opposite – the parties were actively preparing for trial in this Action
8 just before the Parties re-engaged in settlement discussions. Additionally, the settlement
9 was negotiated at arm’s length by experienced counsel with active involvement by
10 Settlement Special Master Patrick A. Juneau over the course of multiple mediations
11 including a mediation on attorneys’ fees. *See* Juneau Decl. at ¶¶6-10.

12 **V. CONCLUSION**

13 For the foregoing reasons, as well as the arguments made in Defendant’s
14 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement (Dkt.
15 No. 275) and Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for
16 Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (Dkt. No. 282), Toyota respectfully requests
17 that the Court: (i) enter an Order granting final approval, pursuant to Federal Rule of
18 Civil Procedure 23 (e), as amended, to the Parties’ proposed class action settlement; (ii)
19 issue a permanent injunction pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) and the
20 exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283; and (iii) provide such other and
21 further relief as the Court deems reasonable and just.

22
23 Dated: December 5, 2024

KING & SPALDING LLP

24
25 *s/s John P. Hooper*
26 John P. Hooper (*pro hac vice*)
27 Alexander G. Calfo
28 Alexandra Kennedy-Breit

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

David L. Schrader (SBN 149638)
david.schrader@morganlewis.com
Lisa R. Weddle
lisa.weddle@morganlewis.com
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
300 South Grand Avenue, 22nd Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Tel: (213) 612-2500
Facsimile: (213) 612-2501

Attorneys for Defendant
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES USA, INC.

1 **CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE**

2 The undersigned, counsel of record for Defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,
3 Inc., certifies that this brief contains 3,220 words, which complies with the word limit of
4 L.R. 11-6.1.

5
6 */s/John P. Hooper* _____
7 John P. Hooper
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28